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Louisiana's Division of Administrative Law: An
Independent Administrative Hearings Tribunal
Ann Wise*
I. INTRODUCTION

Justice and due process areprimordialrights of humans.'
Almost twelve years ago, Louisiana joined a growing
trend and created a centralized, executive branch, administrative
hearings tribunal. The "central panel" movement has been strong,
and more than half the states have adopted some form of quasijudicial tribunal, including most southern states, 2 in addition to
California, 3 Oregon, Washington, Arizona, Colorado, Wyoming,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin,
Maine, Missouri, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and
most recently, Alaska. 4 Washington, D.C. has a central panelplacing the U.S. Supreme Court within its geographic jurisdiction.
Some large cities, including Chicago and to some extent, New
York, as well as our French-speaking neighbors in Quebec,
Canada, have structured their myriad of administrative hearings
into a central office.
Copyright 2008, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
Ann Wise is the founding Director of the Division of Administrative
Law (DAL), and has served in this position since 1996. She is a 1980 graduate
of the LSU Law Center.
1. John Hardwicke, former Chief Administrative Law Judge, Maryland
Office of Administrative Hearings, stated this in remarks before the Central
Panel Directors Conference, Greensboro, NC, November 1, 2007, entitled
"Administrative Law: Beginnings."
2. These states are: Texas, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina,
North Carolina, Tennessee, and Maryland. South Carolina declared its central
panel an "Administrative Law Court," and "an agency and a court of record
within the executive branch of the government of this State," 2004 S.C. Acts
No. 202, § 3.
3. California established the nation's first central panel in 1946.
4. The states of Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky have been studying the
concept for possible implementation. There is some centralization of hearings in
Pennsylvania and Hawaii, but those states have not yet fully realized as central
panels. See Frank Sullivan Jr., Some Questions to Consider Before Indiana
Creates a Centralized Office of Administrative Hearings, 38 IND. L. REv. 389
(2005).
*
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What is a central panel? It is "a cadre of professional
adjudicators who are administratively independent of the agencies
whose cases
they hear, and thus, they are removed from agency
5
influence."
Why are they created? The justification for an independent
central panel is basic fairness; it is not fair to combine into
one person or political entity all of these powers: to investigate
(like police), to decide whether to bring charges (like grand juries),
to prosecute (like district attorneys), and to decide guilt or
innocence (like judges or juries). Americans feel strongly
about these basic tenets of justice: "This is the American
way. ' , 6 When a government agency threatens to take away or
deny a license, or demand money penalties, people want the
opportunity to appear before an impartial adjudicator who is not
controlled by the same agency as the investigator and prosecutor.
They want an independent review of the facts and the law. When a
central panel's purpose is explained to average citizens, almost
without fail they support it. People want and deserve to feel that
they are getting a "fair shake" in a dispute with a state
agency. 7 It is critical to citizens to know they had their day in
court and that they were treated fairly.
II. HISTORY OF THE DAL ACT
The Division of Administrative Law (DAL) began on October
1, 1996 as the state's centralized administrative hearings tribunal.8
Act 739 was signed into law by Governor Buddy Roemer in 1995.
It had been passed before, and vetoed by Governor Roemer in

5. James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State Administrative Law
Judge: CentralPanelsand Their Impact on State AL! Authority and Standards
ofAgency Review, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 1355, 1356 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
6. House of Representatives Floor Debate on H.B. 41, 2008 1st Extra.

Sess. (now La. Acts No. 23), Feb. 15, 2008 (statement by Rep. Jim Tucker
explaining a proposal to transfer certain hearings to the DAL).
7. See Edward J. Schoenbaum's treatment of this issue in Improving Public
Trust and Confidence in Administrative Adjudication: What an Administrative
Law Judge Can Do, 21 J. NAT'L AsS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1 (2001).

8. 1995 La. Acts No. 739, § 4. Section 2 of that act enacted chapter 13-B,
comprised of Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 49:991-99.

2008]

LOUISIANA 'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1171

1991.9 The history of Louisiana's administrative hearings tribunal
is a story familiar to other states that have established central
panels. The concept is commonly met with skepticism, vigorous
agency resistance, predictions of doom, and eventually-after it
has been implemented
and the benefits experienced-mostly
0
acceptance.'
welcome
9. S.B. 600, Reg. Sess. (La. 1991) (submitted by Senator Bankston). The
veto message may be found at pages 596-99 of the Resume ofActs, Resolutions,
Study Requests and Vetoed Bills of the 1991 session of the Louisiana legislature.
10. A number of articles, many by other central panel directors and chiefs,
outline similar experiences. See Thomas E. Ewing, Chief Administrative Law
Judge, Oregon's Hearing Officer Panel, 23 J. NAT'L A. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 57
(2003) [hereinafter Ewing, Oregon's Panel];Thomas E. Ewing, Oregon's Office
of Administrative Hearings: A Postscript,24 J. NAT'L A. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 21
(2004); Thomas E. Ewing, Independence in Adjudication, Understanding the
Office of Administrative Hearings, 65-APR OR. ST. B. BULL. 17 (2005). See
also Deborah A. Baumer, The Office ofAdministrative Hearings, 30-OCT WYO.
LAW. 20 (2007); George R. Coan, OperationalAspects of a Central Hearing
Examiners Pool: California'sExperiences, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 86 (1975);
Jeffrey G. Colvin & Jonathan Mallamud, Hearing Officers in Pennsylvania:
Recommendations for an Independent Central Office, 15 DUQ. L. REv. 605
(1977); Mark A. Dickerson, The Georgia Office of State Administrative
Hearings, 19 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 121 (1999); William R. Dorsey,
Florida'sContinuing Experiment with the Central Hearing Panel Process: The
Division of Administrative Hearings, 15 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 77
(1995); Edwin L. Felter, Jr., The Hidden Executive Branch Judiciary:Colorado's
CentralPanel Experience-Lessonsfor the Feds, 14 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L.
JUDGES 95 (1994); James F. Flanagan, Report to the Judicial Council on the
Administrative Law Judge Statute, 18 J. NAT'L ASs'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 371
(1998) (on South Carolina); John W. Hardwicke, The Central HearingAgency:
Theory and Implementation in Maryland,14 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 5
(1994) [hereinafter Hardwicke, The CentralHearing Agency]; Duane R. Harves,
Making Administrative Proceedings More Efficient and Effective: How the ALI
CentralPanelSystem Works in Minnesota, 65 JUDICATURE 257 (1981); Daniel R.
E. Jordan, Opening the Floodgates of Decision-Making at the Missouri
Administrative Hearing Commission, 15 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 99
(1995); Marvin Kittrell, ALis in South Carolina, 7 S.C. LAW. 42 (May/June
1996); Raymond Krause, Minnesota's OAH: 30 Years of Innovation in
Administrative Review, 63-FEB BENCH & B. MINN. 17 (2006); Julian Mann, III,
Administrative Justice: No Longer Just A Recommendation, 79 N.C. L. Rev.
1639 (2001); Julian Mann, III, Striving for Efficiency in Administrative
Litigation: North Carolina's Office of Administrative Hearings, 15 J. NAT'L
ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 221 (1995); Christopher B. McNeil, Due Process and
the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act: The Central Panel Proposal,23 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 783 (1997); William B. Sweet, South Carolina'sALJ." Central
Panel, Administrative Court, or a Little of Both?, 48 S.C. L. REv. 1 (1996);
Sheila Bailey Taylor, The Growth and Development of a Centralized
AdministrativeHearingsProcess in Texas, 17 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES
113 (1997). For central panels generally, see Ron Beal, The Texas State Office
of Administrative Hearings: Establishing Independent Adjudications in

1172

2LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 68

Frequently, a central panel is the result of some motivating
event within the state that creates sufficient momentum to
overcome strong opposition from within agencies. In Louisiana,
this momentum was created after a few cases in which
administrative respondents' due process rights were violated.
Students of "admin law" study the 1989 Allen v. La. Board of
Dentistry case. I I The due process rights of physicians were
violated when the board's findings of fact and conclusions of law
were drafted ex parte by the board's prosecutor. An Attorney
General opinion in 1990 warned against an agency's assistant
secretary sitting as a voting member of an administrative board and
then appointing the hearing officer who would decide the
administrative appeal from decision of the same board. 12 "The
procedure followed by the Assistant Secretary in these cases is
analogous to a district judge having the power to appoint the three
' 13
judge appellate panel hearing the appeal from his trial judgment."
Two Department of Environmental Quality cases were
apparently on the minds of legislators, according to discussions
with the original author of the bill and prior legislators who were
members of the committees who heard the bills. In In the Matter
of Rollins Environmental Services, Inc., the DEQ secretary was
recused from deciding a waste facility permit case because she had
investigated the incident at issue, issued the compliance order to
shut down the plant, and made repeated public statements

Contested Case Proceedings While Preserving the Power of Institutional

Decision Making, 25 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 119 (2005); John W.

Hardwicke, The Central Panel Movement: A Work in Progress, 53 ADMIN. L.
REV. 419 (2001) [hereinafter Hardwicke, The Central Panel Movement]; Allen
C. Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 1990s, 46
ADMIN. L. REV. 75 (1994), reprintedin 14 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES
107 (1994); Allen C. Hoberg, Ten Years Later: The Progress of State Central
Panels, J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 235 (2001); Harold Levinson, The
Central Panel System: A Framework That Separates ALJs from Administrative
Agencies, 65 JUDICATURE 236 (1981); Malcolm Rich, Adapting the CentralPanel
System: A Study of Seven States, 65 JUDICATURE 246 (1981); Malcolm Rich,
CentralPanelsof Administrative Law Judges: An Introduction, 65 JUDICATURE 233
(1981); Victor Rosenblum, The CentralPanel System: Enhancing Administrative
Justice, 65 JUDICATURE 235 (1981).
11. 543 So. 2d 908 (La. 1989).
12. La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 90-83, 1990.
13. Id.
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(including interviews reported by the Wall Street Journal)
regarding her resolve to close the respondent's entire facility
permanently. 14
During the year the first central panel bill passed the legislature
(later vetoed), another DEQ secretary was recused from deciding
an adjudication because of prejudicial public statements. The first
circuit noted:
When acting as adjudicators, administrative officers should
conduct themselves as judges do ....
[T]hey must realize
the importance of the positions of public trust they hold and
endeavor, however difficult, to avoid any appearance of
partiality or prejudgment of matters either pending or to be
pending before them. The appearance of impartiality and
fairness is just as important as being impartial and fair and
is essential to maintaining
the integrity of the
5
process.'
administrative
Shortly before DAL came into existence, another state agency
violated administrative due process. In Georgia Gulf Corporation
v. Board of Ethics for Public Employees, the state supreme court
declared it impermissible for the Board of Ethics to commingle
prosecutorial and adjudicative roles by allowing the commission's
prosecutor and counsel to prepare its decision.
The court
explained that a party denied the right to a neutral decision maker
is denied due process. 16 The court stated:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process.... This applies to administrative agencies which
adjudicate as well as to courts ....
Not only is a biased
decision maker constitutionally unacceptable but our

14. 481 So. 2d 113 (La. 1985). When she appointed a hearing officer to
handle the adjudicatory hearing, she even directed him not to consider nor
recommend any sanctions, reserving that decision for herself.
15. In re Am. Waste & Pollution Control Co., 581 So. 2d 738, 741-42 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1991). For a good discussion of the fairness requirement as it
applies to administrative law, see Bernard Schwartz, Bias in Webster and Bias
in Administrative Law-The Recent Jurisprudence,30 TULSA L. J. 461 (1995).
16. 694 So. 2d 173 (La. 1997).
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system of law has always7 endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness. 1
It was against this backdrop, and the acceleration of the central
panel movement in other states, that the DAL Act emerged. The
minutes of the legislative committee hearings concerning the
enabling legislation and subsequent amendments show the
legislators' desire to establish a centralized agency where ALJs
could render decisions without fear of offending their appointing
authority. Over the intervening twelve years, there were numerous
failed attempts to weaken the DAL Act. Testimony from those
hearings highlighted the concerns that led to the Act's
passage, and
8
attacks.'
annual
subsequent
withstand
to
its ability
The DAL Act, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 49:991, et
seq, provide that the division shall handle all adjudications of any
state agency of the executive branch of state government. There
are specified exemptions, notably Departments of Labor and
Agriculture cases, boards and commissions, the Public Service
Commission, and some Department of Natural Resources
matters. 19 There is a broad and often misinterpreted exemption for
agencies that are "required, pursuant to a federal mandate and as a
condition of federal funding, to conduct or render a final order in
an adjudication proceeding ....,20 The
Act is supplemented with
21
procedures.
hearing
govern
that
rules

17. Id. at 177 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). See also
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
18. For discussion of SB 636 (which became the DAL Act), see the minutes
of the May 23, 1995 meeting of the House and Governmental Affairs committee
and the May 10, 1995 meeting of the Senate and Governmental Affairs
committee. For discussion of HB 2206 (which became Louisiana Acts Number
1332), see the minutes of May 6, 1999 meeting of the House and Governmental
Affairs committee and the June 9, 1999 meeting of the Senate and
Governmental Affairs committee.
19. The April 2000 Louisiana Legislative Auditor's Report, Analysis of
Overlap, Duplicationand Fragmentationacross Executive Branch Departments
urged the legislature to consider amending Revised Statutes section 49:992 to
remove some of the exemptions it allows in order to achieve greater economy of
scale by centralizing the administrative hearings function.
20. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:992 (2008).
21. LA. ADMiN. CODE tit. 1, pt. 3 (2007).
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III. THE ROLE OF THE DAL DIRECTOR
The administrator of Louisiana's central panel is statutorily
titled the "director., 22 Although this term is common, many
states name this position the "chief administrative law judge,"
and the incumbent may hear and decide cases in addition to his or
her administrative duties. 23 The DAL director does not function
as an ALJ and does not decide the outcome of cases, which is
wholly the duty of the ALJs.
The DAL director is appointed by the governor and confirmed
by the state senate for a fixed, six-year term, and may be
reappointed and confirmed for subsequent six year terms without
limitation.24 The director's term is intentionally neither "at will"
nor concurrent with an appointing governor's four-year elected
term of office. The legislature wanted to ensure the director's
professionalism and independence from any attempts to use
political influence to sway particular case decisions.
The director must be a licensed and resident Louisiana
attorney engaged in the practice of law for at least five years prior
to appointment. 2
The director is a full-time, unclassified
employee, and "shall not accept or engage in additional
employment of any kind., 26 This shields the director from
conflicts of interest, as the DAL's customers are all the agencies,
citizens, and businesses in the state.
Responsibility rests with the director for the overall integrity
and competence of the central panel. It is a job as broad as that
of any state agency chief, with a grant of authority to
"[a]dminister and cause the work of the division to be performed
in such a manner and pursuant to such a program as may be
22. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:995 (2008).
23. The title "chief administrative law judge" is used in Florida, Georgia,
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Oregon, Washington,
Minnesota, New Jersey, Alaska, and Washington, D.C. Massachusetts uses "Chief
Administrative Magistrate."
24.

§ 49:995(A), (B)(1).

Currently moving through the 2008 Regular

Session is HB 901 which would change the director's term to a fixed four year
term, "subject to the approval of the House of Representatives and confirmation
by the Senate."
25.

§ 49:995(A).

26. § 49:995(C). The Director is the only unclassified employee in the entire
Department of Civil Service; the ALJs and support staff are classified civil servants.
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appropriate." 27
This includes responsibility for all hiring,
purchasing, compliance with various state reporting deadlines,
responding to audits, overseeing the employee evaluation
program, providing information to other agencies, testifying
before legislative committees, responding to media inquiries,
developing good working relationships with customer agencies,
meeting with appointed and elected officials, participating in bar
associations, responding to law suits against the agency,
managing subordinate supervisors, preparing and defending
agency budgets, promoting the DAL, complying with a vast
amount of laws and regulations, and every type of problem
solving. In short, the director is a public administrator with a
quasi-judicial bent.
The director protects the ALJs' decisional independence by
shielding them from interference and pressure from respondents,
agency personnel, witnesses, or elected officials. The director
reviews and evaluates any complaints received to assure the
competence and fairness of the adjudicatory process, but is not
involved in affecting the outcome of any case. He or she should
passionately guard the decisional independence of the ALJs,
while assuring that the public service provided meets high
standards of competence, timeliness, fairness, and ethics. A good
director performs a fine balancing act. One commentator has
noted:
It is the [director] who must skillfully and properly deal
with external forces. Indeed, individual ALJs whose "true
and real independence of judgment" is protected by the
existence of a central panel may not be aware of attacks
upon their decisions. In other words, the [director] should
be the lightning rod for forces intent on challenging the
independence and integrity of decision-makers [ALJs].28

27. § 49:996(1).
28. Hardwicke, supra note 10, at 426.
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OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE

A. Early Challenges
The first DAL director was appointed only forty-two days
before the October 1, 1996, statutory start of the agency. 29 The
entire agency had to be "made from scratch." The ingredients for
this new Louisiana gumbo were the statute itself and the entirely
dissimilar hearings processes, policies, cultures, rules, and
personnel among the agencies. There was no physical office for
the agency, there was no budget yet appropriated, 30 and there were
uncertainties regarding what agencies and employees currently
performing adjudicatory functions were to be transferred into the
new DAL.3 1 Although the DAL Act provided in section 3 that
state agencies were supposed to provide information about their
employees who performed these functions, this information was
not complete.
Louisiana's experience with agency resistance to the new
central panel was not unlike that of other states. 32 Some agencies
were helpful and cooperative and transferred personnel, budgets,
computer equipment, and the case files without artifice. Others did
not. Some played "hide and go seek," shifting ALJs and support
staff into other sections of their agencies and giving them new job
titles so that on the transfer date they were no longer officially
listed as hearings personnel. This reduced the number of positions
the agencies lost through transfer to DAL and the dollars budgeted
for salaries and benefits they had to transfer. Another game was to
transfer fewer, or no, positions to DAL, or to transfer lower level
vacant positions (with smaller salaries) instead of the positions
matching the experienced employees who had been performing
29. The author took office August 19, 1996.
30. It was not until the end of the 1997 legislative session, and three days
before the end of that fiscal year, that DAL received supplemental
appropriations to repay start up operating costs. 1997 La Acts No. 471.
31. § 49:994(C) (transferring to DAL on October 1, 1996 all persons
employed in affected agencies who handle adjudications).
32. See supra note 10 for articles recounting other central panel chiefs'
experiences. The Director learned that two weeks after DAL began, the Central
Panel Directors were having their annual meeting. The advice and guidance the
other states' chiefs offered about how to set up a central panel was a saving
grace. I profusely thank them for their help and enjoy their continued support.
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adjudicatory functions. Some agencies first agreed to transfer
cases, but upon realizing that they would no longer control the
hearings and decisions, they refused to send them and suddenly
discovered vague and unproven exemptions from the Act.
At first, there was no office space for the DAL. The
Department of Civil Service was generous in its support of the new
entity, providing the director temporary office space, supplies, and
guidance. Later in the year, a few rooms were made available in
an office building (now demolished and replaced), which had been
closed for asbestos containment and repairs. 33 We made it work
because that was all we had.
Agencies were expected to transfer desks, computers, and
operating expenses that had been used by their former adjudicatory
staff to DAL. Some did. One removed the AL's computer
equipment overnight. Another transferred broken and severely
inadequate computers (including antique 150MHz processors)
from which all operating software had been stripped. An agency
even packed up and removed small supplies belonging to the DAL:
staplers, scotch tape, legal pads, and ink pens. The DAL staff was
no longer surprised by anything.
The newly independent ALJs gradually adjusted to seeing
themselves as separate from, and no longer part of, the
management structure of their prior agencies. Most began thinking
of themselves as independent adjudicators. Fresh air flowed. This
new "breathing room" revealed some of the less than
impartial
34
hearings procedures that had been acceptable routine.
Pre-DAL, the ALJs' supervisors frequently were the agency's
prosecuting attorneys who appeared before those ALJs at the
hearings. Some ALJs reported to their agency's general counsel.
The conflict of interest inherent in this arrangement is obvious.
Many ALJs helped prepare the agency's case files to be introduced
as evidence at the hearings. They were required to review the file
33. It was only habitable after extensive cleaning and repainting. Used
office furniture and equipment was purchased from a state property surplus
warehouse.
34. The author discusses this topic to demonstrate the deep structural
justifications for the DAL as an independent central panel, but is specifically not
accusing any current agency personnel of misdeeds. These problems existing
over a decade ago were solved by the implementation and acceptance of the
DAL as described in this article.
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before the hearing and determine whether it comprised a prima
facie case supporting the agency's action. If agency documents
were incomplete or missing, the ALJ was expected to request and
obtain them. ALJs reported walking to other sections of their
departments to search out and retrieve the necessary
documentation. 35 "They were active,
if invisible to the public,
36
prosecutors of the agency's case."
Commonly, agencies referred to the in-house ALJs as "their"
judges. Some ALJs perceived a loss of personal status they had
enjoyed as the judge for the department head. They continued to
sign their decisions as "Judge for the commissioner/secretary of
agency" and balked at changing their decisions' headings to reflect
the new tribunal, Division of Administrative Law. At least one
transferred ALJ did not see it as improper for agency attorneys,
immediately following the public presentation of the state's
evidence in a case before "their" judge, to proceed to further
discussions behind closed doors in the judge's office. 3 7 A
legislator openly recounted in legislative committee meetings his
experiences with an agency in-house judge falling asleep during
hearings he had attended, seemingly without consequence.
A lack of impartiality was apparent, as was a lack of procedural
efficiency. There was little consistency among the agencies
transferred as to process and case procedure, case docketing,
content of decisions, qualifications of hearing officers,
accountability, and statistical record keeping.
All of these
processes have been made uniform and consistent for all agencies
within the central panel.

35. Upon discovery, the Director ordered that activity to stop immediately.
36. Judges Hardwicke & Thomas E. Ewing, The CentralPanel: A Response
to Critics, 24 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGEs 231, 233 (2004) (Judge Ewing
recounting similar practices prior to Oregon's central panel).
37. Some ALJs' offices were conveniently adjacent to the agency attorneys'
offices. Ex parte communications, already prohibited in the APA, are proscribed
in the DAL Act. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:998(F) (2008).
38. Rep. Peppi Bruneau repeated this story before the House and
Governmental Affairs Committee on May 6, 1999 during consideration of HB
2206. That bill provides that no agency or agency official is entitled to judicial
review of ALJ decisions. It became Louisiana Acts Number 1332. The DAL
Act specifies that an evaluation of ALJ performance include the judge's
"attentiveness." § 49:997(B)(2).
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Lack of these types of quality assurance wastes state funds and
resources. One agency used a contract ALJ who rarely issued
written decisions or kept records of continued cases; it later found
39
that it could not collect millions of dollars of outstanding fines.
When the DAL began hearing the agency's cases, they were
electronically docketed, case records were kept, and written
continuances, orders, and decisions were issued. Implementation
of these processes dramatically increased citizens' payments of
adjudicated fines.
The personnel transferred to DAL remained in their same
office locations at the agencies for which they continued to
conduct hearings. Structural independence on paper was good, but
not sufficient to eliminate interference by customer agencies.
Some agencies strongly indicated that DAL ALJs were no longer
welcome and wanted them moved out. One agency involuntarily
moved a judge in a state office building to a small one room office
with no hearing room and no litigant or witness waiting area.4°
Physical separation of the ALJs from their customer agencies was
necessary to insulate them from the continuing opportunity for ex
The prosecuting and
parte communications and influences.
judging functions should be separate not only in fact, but also in
appearance.

39. A Financial and Compliance Audit by the Legislative Auditor on May
31, 2000 found that the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries had $2.6 million in
uncollected fines. The Department responded by letter attached to the report,
that "these civil fines are considered by legal counsel to be uncollectible since
due process was not afforded to the violators." The agency noted that there had
been no provisions for due process adjudicatory hearings until the DAL began
handling their hearings in late 1996.
40. DAL's Budget Request for fiscal year 1997-98 is a public document.
Pages 21-22 of the Continuation Budget Package described the hostility from
host agencies and other detriments experienced from having the ALJs housed in
the agencies for which they conducted hearings: compromise of their
independence and impartiality; ex parte communications; procedural
inefficiencies from several different case intake systems, docketing and filing;
duplication of overhead expenses; uneven staffing; and barriers to consolidating
workloads.
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B. Efficiencies Realizedfrom Consolidationof Offices and
Personnel
Pre-DAL, the Department of Public Safety hearings had been
handled by hearing officers domiciled in seven separate offices
maintained in Baton Rouge, Lafayette, Shreveport, Metairie, Lake
Charles, Monroe, and West Monroe. After DAL, the caseload
numbers in each location were closely analyzed. The new central
panel was politically free to close low volume locations. The
result was a more efficient and cost effective use of personnel and
sharing of caseloads statewide. 4 1 Today, DAL houses full time
ALJs in only three locations: Baton Rouge, Shreveport and
Lafayette. DAL serves customers in other cities at its hearing
rooms in Lake Charles and Monroe, and at borrowed hearing
locations in Metairie, 42 Mandeville, Gray, and Alexandria.
The director made a special appeal at a meeting of the House of
Representatives' Appropriations Committee for funds to rent a
central office and consolidate the five different locations in Baton
Rouge. 43 On March 1, 1999, this finally occurred, and the
personnel and agencies were moved into two floors downtown, a
few blocks from the state Capitol, with hearing rooms. This
was a
44
impartiality.
and
efficiency
in
improvement
monumental
Support staff had been abundant at some agencies; scant at
others. It was more efficient and cost effective to centralize and

41. There was insufficient workload in the Monroe area for one full time
office, much less two. Today, DAL leases one small room in Monroe. An ALJ
from the Shreveport office travels there to conduct hearings, usually once
weekly. This equaled a reduction from ten workdays to one in that city, and
allowed a beneficial consolidation of workload so that the Shreveport office
could absorb increased work in its growing metro area. The Lake Charles office
was reduced from a five day a week full-time hearings office to a small room
visited one day about every other week by the ALJ domiciled in Lafayette.
42. The Metairie office had been moved to downtown New Orleans and
expanded with the workload, until the devastating hurricanes of 2005 reduced
the caseload and budget cuts closed that office. It is slated to reopen.
43. Funds were included in 1997 La. Acts No. 18.
44. Not all the ALJs wanted to be separate from their parent agenciesperhaps an indication of their too-cozy relationship. One returned to an AU
position at their original agency which had not been transferred to DAL, and
another voluntarily retired the day before the move. Others resented the loss of
special perks they had enjoyed at their prior agency, such as personally assigned,
take-home state vehicles, and other state equipment.
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consolidate the use of all support staff, but some judges naturally
regretted the loss of "their" secretaries, paralegals, or law clerks.
C. Housed in the Departmentof Civil Service
State agencies are not freely floating entities, and structurally
tend to be "attached" to some department of state government.
DAL was legislatively placed within the Department of State Civil
Service (DSCS). It is a fairly independent and well chosen
location.
The director of State Civil Service is not a
gubernatorially appointed cabinet official; rather, he or she is a
classified state employee selected by the State Civil Service Board.
The DAL director is the only unclassified employee in the entire
department, and does not report to, and is not supervised by, the
DSCS director. The DAL does not handle employee civil service
appeals by state employees, as the civil service board's powers are
established in the state constitution. Thus, no conflict of interest
exists.
The DSCS provides accounting, payroll, budgeting, human
resource, purchasing, and other support functions to the DAL and
other boards under its umbrella. This has been a cost-effective
sharing of state administrative resources. DSCS has no influence
whatsoever over DAL's ALJs or adjudicatory functions.
D. Budget andBilling
DAL's budget is annually approved by the legislature as part of
the general appropriation bill.45 Currently, most customer agencies
pay DAL a flat rate, through interagency transfer (IAT) of funds
from their accounts through the state treasury. The ALJs and case
assistants keep records of the time they spend on cases and work
for each agency. The total hours, usually for the preceding
calendar year, are divided by the hours for a particular agency,
which gives a percentage of the workload for that agency.
Generally, that part of the DAL's total budget (which is IAT) is
multiplied by this percentage to determine the IAT amount owed
by each customer agency for the following fiscal year. If major
45.

DAL is agency number 17-564.
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changes to the caseload are expected due to new laws or increased
enforcement, adjustments are made. The Office of Planning and
Budget within the Division of Administration handles this
function. A few agencies pay an hourly rate, usually if they are
"off-budget" agencies or occasional customers. Some agencies
enter into contracts for DAL's ALJ services for new or special
cases. The DAL Act was amended to authorize the tribunal to
provide ALJs on a contractual basis to any governmental entity not
covered by the act. 46 This has allowed DAL to assist agencies with
hearings that are not required to be handled by DAL.
E. PlanningandPerformance
DAL's mission statement is "[t]o provide a neutral forum for
handling administrative hearings for certain state agencies, with
respect for the dignity of individuals and their due process
rights.,, 4 7 DAL has an annual operational plan and a five-year
strategic plan. 48 It has goals, objectives, and performance
indicators based upon its budget, and performance values it is
expected to attain. 49 Key performance indicators are reported
quarterly and supporting indicators are reported semi-annually. It
is a public, transparent reporting of the agency's input and output
of work and its efficiency in performing that work. Another
positive distinction between DAL and agencies that conduct their
own hearings is that DAL's reports of performance are far more
extensive and detailed.
No other state agency, board, or
commission that conducts its own hearings collects or reports as

46. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:999.1 (2008).
47. Division of Administrative Law, Strategic Plan, http://www.adminlaw.
state.la.us/strategicplan.htm (last visited May 12, 2008) (detailing the mission
statement).
48. These are filed with the Office of Planning and Budget (OPB), and can
be viewed on the DAL's website. See DEP'T OF CIVIL SERV. Div. OF ADMIN.
LAW, STRATEGIC PLAN, FY 2008-2009 THROUGH FY 2012-2013, http://www.
adminlaw.state.la.us/docs/2005-2009%20STRATEGIC%20PLAN.pdf.
49. See Office of Planning and Budget, http://doa.louisiana.gov/opb/lapas/
lapas.htm (last visited May 12, 2008) (reporting on Louisiana Performance and
Accountability System).
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much performance data.5 0 Promptness in handling hearings and
issuing decisions are particular features of this reporting.

DAL Performance Indicators
(Jan '07 through Dec '07)
Cases docketed
Hearings conducted
Decisions & orders
Settlements
Pre-hearing conferences
Fees assessed
Mediations conducted

10,323
9,348
11,906
809
725
$1,327,149
4

Performance Indicators Showing Speed and
Efficiency of Operation 5'
(Jan. '07 through Dec. '07)
Average length of time from the date docketed to case
closed (i.e., speed of handling cases from beginning to
end): 55 days
Average length of time from record closed to decision
signed: 6.5 days
Average length of hearings: 25 minutes
Hearings held in less than 30 minutes: 57%

50. See Division of Administrative Law, Executive Summary, http://www.
adminlaw.state.la.us/docs/DAL%20executive%20summary.pdf (last visited May
12, 2008) (providing performance indicators and benchmarks).
51. In order to more accurately represent DAL's typical performance, these
statistics exclude those unusually high volume, quick turnaround, Department of
Labor hurricane disaster unemployment compensation recovery cases that DAL
handled only during FY 07-08.
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Benchmarking:
Nationwide Comparison with Performance of Other
State Administrative Hearings Panels
" DAL cost per hearing is less than 27% of the Southern
Regional Average among centralized administrative
hearings panels.
" Average DAL ALJ caseload is 536 cases.
* ALJs handle their caseload with no ALJ secretarial
staff.
" DAL support staff (primarily the clerk's office) equals
less than 29% of the Southern Regional Average.
e - DAL's budget is only 27.2% of the National Average,
while DAL has a larger amount of work relative to that
budget: 36.8% of the average number of cases filed and
52.5% of the average number of decisions and orders
issued.52
The DAL's operation is efficient and cost-effective in delivering
adjudication services. In 2003, DAL's performance was recognized
and its civil servants received an Exceptional Performance award
from the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget.
F. Clerk ofAdministrative Hearings
The clerk's office receives, dockets, and processes cases
similar to a judicial clerk in a state or federal court. New cases are
filed only by agencies, not directly by respondents. The clerk's
office prepares and mails notices of hearings, subpoenas, orders,
and decisions, and posts hearing dockets on the DAL website.
New cases are entered into an electronic case docketing and
tracking software system. Case documents are scanned, and the
hearings are electronically recorded into the system. Computer

52. See Division of Administrative Law, http://www.adminlaw.state.la.us/
director.htm (last visited May 12, 2008). This data is reported in the annual
Operational Plan part of "Budget Request-Division of Administrative LawFiscal Year 2008/2009," a public document.
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technology is extensively employed to53 increase efficiency, reduce
case handling time, and preserve files.
Hearings are assigned by case schedulers supervised by the
clerk's office. Case scheduling involves considering the
geographic venue of where the hearing should be held pursuant to
statutes or rules and the location of the nearest DAL office and
available ALJ. Though ALJs are cross-trained on most areas of
law, consideration is given to the availability of an ALJ having the
requisite expertise. The number and complexity of cases assigned
and the number of days that will need to be left open in the
schedule for decision writing is gauged. Many hearings require
travel to field sites, and travel duty rotates among the judges. A
particular AU may be unavailable due to personal leave, so
workloads among the judges should be balanced as much as
possible. The case schedulers consider all these factors in
assigning the cases.
G. Quality Assurance
Quality assurance is integral to an effective central panel
operation. This takes the form of the formal operational and
strategic planning already mentioned, and managing to meet
performance indicators. The DAL Act provides that customers
who have appeared before the judges shall be surveyed for their
comments.
Employees' performance is formally evaluated at
least annually. The DAL is audited for performance measures,
property control, and fiscal procedures.
The legislative
committees-House and Governmental Affairs and Senate
Governmental Affairs---exercise oversight and scrutiny of DAL's
rules and procedures.

53. An
office, and
technology,
54. LA.
any similar
judges.

entire article could be written about the operations of the clerk's
improvements implemented by the DAL in terms of information
but that will not be attempted here.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:997(C) (2008). The author is not aware of
laws requiring such surveys by agencies that employ their own
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V. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
"[A]dministrative law judges are an integral part of the judicial
enterprise.... One cannot work in government but for a short time
without being enormously impressed with the critical contribution
to the people's business performed by administrative law
judges."
Agencies are concerned with implementation of agency policy,
but an independent central panel's primary concern is observing
due process as fairly as possible. This requires competent and welltrained judges. The DAL Act states the essential qualifications for
ALJs, their authority, conduct, evaluations of performance, and
protects their decisional independence.
A. ALJ Qualifications
56
The ALJ must be a Louisiana resident and licensed attorney
who has been engaged in the practice of law for at least five years
prior to employment. 7 Like other DAL employees, ALJs are
classified as civil servants5 8 who are strictly prohibited from any
participation in political activity. Though ALJs are hired by the
DAL director, applications must begin through the formal
Department of Civil Service process.5 9 The work of judging is a

55. Sullivan, supra note 4.
56. When the DAL began, a few non-attorney ALJs were transferred from
the Office of Motor Vehicles in the Department of Public Safety (DPS). They
were "grandfathered in" by Louisiana Revised Statutes section 49:994(C). As a
result of retirements over the years, at present only one non-attorney ALJ
remains who continues to handle only DPS cases.
57. § 49:994(A). Most ALJs hired have ten to twenty or more years of
experience practicing law. Louisiana Acts Number 23 of the 2008 First
Extraordinary Session of the Louisiana Legislature requires additional
qualifications for DAL ALJs who hear Louisiana Board of Ethics adjudications:
not less than two years of experience as an ALJ or not less than ten years
experience in the practice of law. § 42:1141(C)(4)(a) (effective August 15,
2008).
58. § 49:992(C).
59. Application for an ALJ position begins like other civil service positions:
It is announced and posted on the Department of Civil Service's website for a
limited time period, and applicants must complete and submit the standard SF10 form to human resource personnel. Employees of the Department of Civil
Service initially review the applications for compliance with their rules, and then
a list of applicants is forwarded to DAL supervisors for screening. Writing
samples are reviewed, interviews are conducted, and a test of decision writing
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full-time profession. 60 Judges are statutory employees of the
division 61 and may not be hired as outside contractors. When they
become permanent state employees, they enjoy the protections
afforded by the civil service system and can only be terminated for
them from any political pressure on their
cause. 62 This insulates
63
decision-making.
B. ALJAuthority
The ALJ's authority includes: (1) regulating the adjudicatory
proceedings assigned to him; (2) issuing such decisions and orders
as are necessary to promote a fair, orderly and prompt
adjudication; and (3) exercising those powers vested in the
presiding officer by the Administrative Procedure Act.64
The Administrative Procedure Act sets forth the judges'
powers to administer oaths, to set the time and place for continued
hearings, issue subpoenas and discovery orders, to fix the time for
filing of briefs and other documents, and to direct the parties to
appear and consider simplification of the issues. 65 The technical
aspects of ALJs' duties comprise a longer list and are similar to
those of agencies' in-house hearing officers. What separates
central panel ALJs from those agency personnel is the duty owed
to their customers: the respondent, the agency, counsel, and
witnesses. Professor Ron Beal suitably described this
responsibility:

and computer usage skills is given. The candidate's background, references,
standing with the bar, and any bar disciplinary actions or ethics complaints may
be checked.
60. Occasionally, flex time or part-time hours are granted.
61. § 49:994(B).
62. See LA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
63. See LA. CONST. art. X, § 9; LA. CIVIL SERv. R. CH. 14.1(e)-(g) (2008);
STATE OF LA., DEPT. OF STATE CIVIL SERV., GENERAL CIRcuLAR No. 001691
(Apr. 24, 2007), available at http://www.civilservice.la.gov/PROGASST/
Gencirc/GENCIRC07/001691 .htm.
64. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:994(D) (2008) (granting the ALJs power
to conduct telephone or video hearings and to continue hearings for witnesses
called to military service).
65. See § 49:956.
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Their duty is to be charged with the solemn trust to act
fairly and impartially in fulfilling their vested duties. Each
act performed must be done with genuine even-handedness,
compelled by a firm desire to provide to everyone their
due. The overriding goal should be to shun any action or
the faith and
conduct that would tend to undermine
66
public.
the
and
parties
the
confidence of
The DAL ALJs have a unique level of decisional independence
among central panels nationwide. They issue the final decision or
order in cases, and the agency has no authority to override that
decision or order. A losing respondent may appeal to the judicial
(usually district) courts. But neither the agency, nor any agency
official nor any other person acting on the agency's or an official's
behalf, is entitled to judicial review of the ALJ's decision. 67 This
provision has been controversial, to say the least. Yet, the legality
of this legislative policy decision was upheld by the state supreme
court in the notable case, Wooley vs. State Farm Insurance Co.,68
which found that DAL ALJs exercise quasi-judicial powers.
C. AL! Conduct and Ethics Codes
The ALJs' conduct is governed by the Louisiana Code of
Governmental Ethics 69 and the Louisiana State Bar Code of
Additionally, DAL developed and
Professional Conduct.70
instituted its own "Code of Judicial Conduct for Administrative
Law Judges" to establish and provide guidance to ALJs in
71
maintaining high standards of judicial and personal conduct.
Training in ethics and professionalism is provided to the ALJs and
66. Beal, supra note 10, at 135 (citing Lewis v. Guar. Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 483 S.W.2d 837, 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)).
67. See §§ 49:992(B)(2)-(3); 49:958.
68. 893 So. 2d 746 (La. 2005).
69. §§ 42:1101-70 (detailin2 the Louisiana Code of Governmental Ethics).
70. See LA. STATE BAR ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION. art. 16 (2007); LA.
RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:222 (2008).

71. Last revised in 2004, it is based upon all of the following: the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct as adopted by the American Bar Association on
August 7, 1990; the February 1989 Model Code of Judicial Conduct for Federal
ALJs; the Model Code of Judicial Conduct for State ALJs adopted by the

National Association of ALJs; and the Model Code of Judicial Conduct for State
Central Panel ALJs.
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staff each year. The seriousness of ethical conduct by the ALJs is
emphasized by its inclusion as a distinct factor in each AL and
case assistant's required annual Performance Planning and Review
document.
D. Requisite ALJ Skills
The job of adjudicator as practiced at the DAL requires a nutsand-bolts type of professional. An ALJ must handle a diverse
caseload, travel statewide to conduct hearings, work without a
bailiff, secretary, or law clerk, be proficient in the use of a
computer to perform his own research and writing, and type his
own decisions. In addition to judicial qualities, it requires a high
degree of organizational skills, self-discipline to meet decision
writing and case handling deadlines to keep the docket moving,
and the ability to work with a team of ALJs, administrative
hearings clerk's staff, and other office professionals.
The judge must be able to handle both complex cases argued
by highly experienced attorneys from large law firms and agencies,
as well as simple fact cases with unrepresented parties who do not
understand the hearings process. They should be comfortable
administering justice fairly for all in any scenario. Honing these
skills necessitates regular training.
E. ALJ Training
A high degree of professionalism must be maintained by an
AL. The DAL Act requires the development and maintenance of
a program for the continual training and education of the Aids in
72
regard to their responsibilities and administrative procedures.
They gain proficiency in substantive and procedural law, due
process hearing procedures, evidence, docket management, agency
processes, handling unrepresented parties, judicial demeanor and
maintaining impartiality, computer skills, and much more. Aids
learn techniques to guide parties wishing to settle cases, and some
are trained mediators.

72.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:996(4) (2008).
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DAL's training program includes sending ALJs to week long
classes at the National Judicial College in Reno, Nevada, on
conducting fair hearings.
DAL's judges attend specialized
seminars sponsored by the National Association of Administrative
Law Judges (NAAL) and its Louisiana chapter (LAALJ). Several
times each year the DAL hosts its own continuing education
seminars. Judicial district and appellate court judges, and ALJs
and chief ALJs from other states continue to be instrumental in
offering their time and expertise in assisting with training.
Speakers include law school professors, private attorneys,
disciplinary counsel from the state bar, personnel from the
Louisiana Board of Ethics, experts in legal writing, and state
agency personnel. Agency participation is most valuable. When a
new area of law is transferred to DAL, particularized training is
given, often by agency personnel with expertise in that field.
Central panel judges are generalists who handle many types of
cases. Cross-training provides maximum flexibility for case
scheduling and efficient distribution of caseload among the judges.
This differentiates DAL from agencies' own hearing officers who
tend to be narrow specialists in the particular cases of that agency.
Agencies, boards, and commissions do not have state laws
requiring them to conduct training in due process hearings for their
adjudicators. The lack of training concerning how to conduct a
due process hearing might contribute to the impression that some
agencies or boards' hearings processes are not fair.
It is not sufficient that an AU to be a technical expert in
agency law and policy. The officer of justice should be able to
impartially balance his or her knowledge of the law with sensitivity
to the impact of the application of the law and agency policy on the
citizen. The DAL Act recognizes the need for DAL ALJs to be
experts in administrative due process procedures and attentive to
fairness and objectivity. This combination of expertise and
fairness is one of the advantages of the central panel.73

73. During the floor debate on House Bill 41 Rep. Norton stated that using
DAL ALJs is "an excellent idea" since "the Judge would be better able [than the
agency] to make a call; know what they are doing." House of Representatives
Floor Debate on H.B. 41, 2008 1st Extra. Sess. (now La. Acts No. 23), Feb. 15,
2008.
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F. JudicialPerformanceEvaluations
Unlike Article III judges, DAL ALJs are statutorily required to
undergo at least annual evaluations of their performance. 74 Job
reviews are required of all classified civil servants, but the DAL
Act compels the director to develop and implement a program of
judicial evaluation. 75 This mandate further distinguishes DAL
ALJs from agencies' own, hearing officers: No law requires
agencies, boards, or commissions to be evaluated on how they
conduct administrative hearings. This is a positive distinction.
The statute specifies three areas of judicial performance to be
evaluated: competence, productivity, and demeanor. It covers
judges' consideration of adherence to schedules; courtesy and
attentiveness to the litigants, witnesses, and counsel; knowledge of
the law; analytical, writing, and settlement skills; quantity and
quality of caseload disposition and impartiality. The evaluation
should not include a review of any case results. Judges are
evaluated on their decision-making skills, but not on the outcome
of any case.
The evaluations are performed by ALJ supervisors whose
duties include oversight of judicial quality assurance. They train
new judges, make sure that caseloads are fairly distributed, that
judges are available for hearings when there are absences, and that
hearings are being conducted timely. These managers observe
hearings, meet with agency personnel about improving case
handling processes between the agency and the tribunal, and
troubleshoot day-to-day operational concerns.
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS AND DECISIONS
A. Hearings
The DAL handles about six to ten thousand hearings per year.
Almost all are handled within one day, and decisions are usually
issued within one week. Though they can vary in complexity,
most hearings involve only a few factual or legal issues. This is
typical for the majority of administrative law cases. A few cases
74.
75.

§ 49:997(F) (providing that performance reviews are confidential documents).
§ 49:997.
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are complex, multi-day affairs. The judges are trained to handle a
diversity of cases.
Parties do not have to be represented by an attorney; some are
but many are not. An administrative hearing, though comparable
to a small trial, is typically less formal. Hearsay evidence is
admissible, and hearing procedures are more user-friendly to the
average citizen. The hearings are public, and anyone may attend
unless a specific statute makes it confidential (which is rare). Most76
documents introduced are subject to the Public Records Act.
Adjudications are handled in the manner required by the
78
77
Administrative Procedure Act and DAL's promulgated rules.
Having rules to which all parties must adhere contributes to the
fairness of the process.
Hearings are conveniently located around the state.
Convenience and accessibility to the public and the agencies are
balanced with using an impartial location when reasonably
possible. Procedures are similar to judicial cases, including
witness and document subpoenas, conduct of discovery,
confrontation and cross examination of witnesses,,the introduction
of evidence, and motion practice. The purpose and procedures for
prehearing conferences are specified in the DAL Act and are used
to simplify and expedite cases. Ex parte communications with the
ALJs are strictly prohibited. 79 ALJs may be recused if they have a
conflict of interest in a case that 8 interferes with their ability to
accord a fair and impartial hearing. 0
B. Decisions
Decision-making and decision writing are skills particular to
judges. Decisions must be in writing, and include findings of fact
and conclusions of law. 81 They should be clearly written and
easily understood by the average person. Administrative law
decisions should not read like U.S. Supreme Court decisions or
heavily footnoted law review articles. Yet this is not fill-in-the76.
77.

§§ 44:1-427.
See § 49:992(A)(2). See generally §§ 49:950-99.25.

79.
80.
81.

§ 49:998.
§ 49:999.
§ 49:958 (requiring that decisions be delivered to the parties).

78. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. I, pt. III, ch. 1-7 (2007).
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blank decision-making. DAL devotes training and supervisory
resources to improving judicial writing. Since judging is its
primary function, DAL is motivated to help its ALJs continually
improve these skills as part of its quality assurance measures.
Well-written and clear decisions also improve public trust and
confidence in the adjudicatory process.
C. Finality; Appeals
As previously discussed, only the respondent to the
adjudication, the party against whom agency action was taken or
proposed, may appeal the decision to a judicial court. The agency
is statutorily denied the right to appeal. The legislature justified
this policy decision based upon the reported practice of agencies
using their personnel and budgetary resources to appeal every case
they lost, no matter how small.8 2 Responding to an appeal is very
expensive. A respondent might be left with the choice of either
paying more in attorney fees and missing additional work time for
the appeal or paying the proposed fine, even when he had won his
case before the ALJ. The legislature felt that this was unfair and
made a policy decision to make the DAL ALJ decisions final and
unappealable by agencies and their representatives.
As mentioned, the Wooley v. State Farm case directly attacked
this provision as unconstitutional.
Our state supreme court
83
unanimously disagreed.
Simply put, the legislature has the legal
prerogative to provide such finality to DAL decisions. The
supreme court's decision8 4is well-written and well-reasoned, and its
perusal is recommended.
82. "[T]he power of government is so overwhelming that if government is
allowed to take any case they want to the Supreme Court, no one will be able to
afford to even begin to participate." Minutes of the Senate and Governmental
Affairs Committee meeting June 9, 1999 on HB 2206 (La. Acts No. 1332)
(remarks in support of the bill by its author, Rep. Charles Lancaster).
83. Wooley v. State Farm Ins. Co., 893 So. 2d 746 (La. 2005).
84. Although the author was initially asked to submit an article justifying
the Wooley decision from the DAL's perspective and responding to its critics, in
the author's view the decision is self-explanatory and needs no defense. A
similar suit was unsuccessful in federal court by the next Commissioner of
Insurance who sought to have the decisional finality provisions declared
unconstitutional, this time under the U.S. Constitution. Donelon vs. La. Div. of
Admin. Law, ex rel. Wise, No. 07-30482, 2008 WL 821000 (5th Cir. 2008)
reh 'g denied (Apr. 24, 2008) (affinming the district court's decision to dismiss
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VII. REVIEWING THE ADVANTAGES OF THE DAL
A. Avoiding the Unavoidable:An Agency's Power to Exert Control
Over its "Own" HearingProcess
State agencies have great power. They make laws through
rulemaking. They interpret their own rules and laws. They create
(often unwritten) policies regarding implementation, administration,
and enforcement of the laws. They create the forms that must be
filed to obtain or renew licenses, make financial disclosures, and
otherwise obey their laws and rules. They control the flow of
information provided in response to inquiries on how to comply
with their rules, forms, and procedures. They control the process
by which compliance occurs. They inspect, audit, review, and
investigate businesses and individuals for compliance. They
control the number, frequency, and intensity of inspections, audits,
and investigations. They can hire or fire, and control the pay and
merit raises of the public servants who are expected to perform
these functions. They take and investigate complaints against
those whom they regulate. They have the power to grant licenses
to operate or engage in a profession, or to place restrictions on
those licenses, or to deny them, suspend them, revoke them, or
refuse to renew them. Agencies may bring charges, usually
completely at their discretion, against persons for alleged
violations of the rules and laws. The agency decides whether or
not to seek civil monetary or other penalties allowed by statute,
and often the amount and type of penalties. They decide whether
or not to try to settle, mediate or otherwise resolve the dispute with
a respondent short of proceeding to an administrative hearing. All
of this power stays with the agency, even when a central panel is
used for the hearing.
Usually before the agency can take away a property right such
as a license, or enforce civil penalties, constitutional procedural
due process requires that a person be given an opportunity for a

the case without a hearing based upon Donelon's lack of standing to bring the
cause of action; the district court had dismissed based upon Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity).
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hearing. 5 This right to a predetermination evidentiary hearing is
supposed to enhance the rights of citizens, but if the adjudicator is
not fair and impartial, the citizen's rights may be compromised.
86
An agency can meet due process by using in-house adjudicators,
which are used often. Agencies may try to create fairness by
erecting variously named "walls" within the agency to shield their
employee-adjudicator from their employee-investigators and
employee-prosecutors.
Some opponents of central panels argue that in-house, or
outside contract ALJs, or board members, can provide equally fair
hearings, or that all that is needed are firewalls within the agency
to create sufficient separations between the prosecutors and
adjudicators. 87 If the strict separations that firewalls are intended
to create were rigorously enforced, fairness is theoretically
possible. But theories can be undermined by agencies' natural
overriding desire to enforce their own policies.
B. Flames Lapping Under the "Firewalls"
When agencies do not use an independent central panel, they
usually have the power to exercise some level of control over the
administrative hearing and can use that power to their strategic
advantage. First, they can decide how fast the case will be noticed
and set for hearing. When the agency's decision is challenged by a
request for a hearing, it may be less motivated to move the case
toward a speedy resolution when that resolution could be contrary
to their wishes. Unless there is a statute that provides for a
deadline to set a case for a hearing, agencies can receive a citizen's
request for their due process hearing and delay setting the hearing
date.

85. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see also Wilson v. City of
New Orleans, 479 So. 2d 891 (La. 1985).
86. See Butler v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corrs., 609 So. 2d 790 (La. 1992)
(holding that the fact that the ALJ was employed by and subject to supervision
by the same agency which suspended respondent's license did not violate due
process).
87. Jeff Bush & Kristal Wiitala Knutson, The Building and Maintenance of
"Ethics Walls " in Administrative Adjudicatory Proceedings, 24 J. NAT'L ASS'N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1 (2004).
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Procedural delays can hamper a citizen's ability to continue in
business. If he has been denied a license renewal, for example, in
some cases the person may have to stop taking or serving
customers or risk illegally engaging in a business without a license,
which may expose him to more severe sanctions. He can lose
money, his business, and his reputation while the months drag on,
regardless of the merits of any defense to the agency's action.
Pending charges may constitute a blemish on the respondent's
record, which affects other licenses or endeavors. This is not
meant to presume that any agency would intentionally interfere in
such a way. But the old adage "justice delayed is justice denied" is
true, and delayed justice can have devastating consequences in
administrative law. For example, if an agency can deny, suspend,
or fail to renew a license pending the fair hearing, a person can be
put out of business and suffer great financial hardship, even if
the license or other right is eventually reinstated after a delayed
hearing.
Another factor that may be controlled is where the hearing will
be held. Unless a statute provides otherwise, a person may have to
incur additional expense and lost work time to travel (possibly
across the state) to the agency's office to appear at his in-person
hearing.
When a hearing is noticed and conducted in a timely fashion, it
is important that the decision be rendered promptly. A delayed
decision can result in losses as well. If the initial license denial or
revocation were intended to stop the respondent from conducting a
certain business, for example, then an agency could gain that end
without an evidentiary hearing or decision, by controlling the
hearings process at various points, whether
or not the agency also
88
judge.
the
over
control
has employment
88. See, for example, the protracted procedural history of Doc's Clinic v.
State ex rel. Department of Health & Hospitals, 07-0480, 2007 WL 3246228
(La. App. 1st Cir. 2007), writ denied 974 So. 2d 665 (La. 2008). On October 26,
2000, the Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) issued a violation letter to
Doc's Clinic. Id. at 3. A thirteen day administrative appeal hearing was
conducted beginning in December 2001 and ending in January 2002 and
submitted for decision after briefing on February 25, 2002. Id. at 4. More than
one year later, March 23, 2003, the ALJ submitted a 155 page proposed decision
to the DHH secretary wherein he reversed the department's decision. Id. The
secretary adopted the findings of fact but rejected most conclusions of law;
Doc's appealed to the district court, where the judge concluded that the DHH
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These points are made to explain why an independent tribunal,
particularly a central panel, is better suited to protect due process.
C. Walls Don 't Cover Up the AppearanceProblem
Chief Judge Tom Ewing of Oregon's central panel made this
statement on the public's perception of partiality when the
prosecuting agency employs the ALJ hearing their case:
However
The problem with appearance is obvious.
carefully an agency erects a "Chinese Wall" between its
regulatory staff and administrative law judges (ALJs),
citizens do not know that. If they do know it, they do not
believe it. What citizens know is this: they are fighting the
agency, and they want a fair hearing. When they enter the
hearing room and learn that the judge presiding over the
case is an employee of their adversary, no explanation will
persuade them, especially if they lose, that the outcome was
not predetermined.
D. Benefits
Louisiana's centralized administrative hearings tribunal has
helped to improve government. This Article has outlined many of
the benefits.
Separation of the investigatory, charging, and
prosecutorial functions from the hearings functions has made
adjudications fairer to citizens and businesses, both in appearance
and reality. Cost and performance efficiencies have improved.
DAL has streamlined the hearings process, realizing economies of
scale in combining hearings duties from various agencies into one.

secretary had "acted arbitrarily and capriciously in signing a decision without
first reviewing the entire administrative record." Id. at 5. After almost five
years of remands and appeals, the original ALJ decision was basically upheld
and DHH was assessed court costs and attorney fees.
89. Hardwicke & Ewing, supra note 36, at 232. The authors also elegantly
respond to the "loss of agency expertise" argument by opponents of central
panels. Id. at 238.
90. A good listing of central panels' benefits is made by Allen Hoberg,
Administrative Hearings:State Central Panels in the 1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REV.
75, 76-77 (1994).
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Flexibility has allowed DAL to improve case scheduling and to
aid agencies with special and short-term caseloads. For example,
during 2007-08, DAL streamlined processes for the Louisiana
Department of Labor and speedily resolved several thousand
special cases for the LDOL: an overload of 2005 Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita disaster unemployment compensation recovery
matters. This kind of adaptability saves the state money that might
be wasted if it had to start up a new program just to handle such
cases.
The central panel is an ideal tribunal for political "hot button"
cases. Unlike some agencies and boards, the ALJs are more
insulated from political pressure. Some agencies are pleased to
learn that there exists an impartial administrative tribunal that can
professionally handle sensitive or controversial 9cases
and provide
1
them political "cover" from a disputatious result.
Another benefit has been better quality cases. The prosecuting
agency cannot rely upon an independent ALJ to remedy a deficient
case file. They cannot adopt a laissez-faire attitude about sending
every hearing request to the ALJs. This motivates agencies to
pursue only those cases where the evidence supporting the
agency's action is likely to survive an independent review. If not,
the agency can consider whether they should be pursuing the case.
Government operates more efficiently, and more effectively serves
its citizens, when it avoids insupportable prosecutions.
VIII. CONCLUSION

The story of Louisiana's central panel is similar to others. The
resistance to its implementation was fierce and sometimes
excessive. Yet now, almost twelve years later, the agency has
survived---even flourished. DAL enjoys excellent performance
reviews and has recently been legislatively entrusted with
expanded jurisdiction. 92 Some agencies are pleased with the

91. There have been many instances where agencies, boards, and
commissions that could claim an exemption under the DAL Act have asked
DAL to handle certain cases, which were especially delicate or contentious, or
when there existed too many conflicts of interest among their board members.
92. The success of the DAL would not have been possible without the hard
work, skill, professionalism, and dedication to providing good public service of
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results and express relief at having another agency handle their
adjudications.
Other agencies continue to resist, especially their loss of
control over the hearing process and the final decision. "This
resistance, however, is proof of the need for a central panel. For
the first time ... citizens have an opportunity to adjudicate their
disputes with agencies before judges who are truly independent
and impartial.93 This is not simply good government. It is best
government."
The story of DAL is best concluded with the simple and direct
words of one citizen who insisted on speaking about his hearing
with the director, who anticipated a complaint. In an assertive
manner this gentleman said: "I lost my case, but I got a fair hearing
before a fair judge, and I can't ask for anything more than that."
Words to remember for any judge.

the judges and operational support staff. With respect and gratitude, I dedicate
this article to them.
93. Ewing, Oregon's Panel, supra note 10, at 89. The author thanks Judge
Ewing for permission to freely use his excellent articles about the formation of
the Oregon panel, which were most instructive. Also thanks to Chief Judge
Julian Mann of North Carolina's central panel, for his outstanding advice and
guidance.

